CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 30 March 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. D.D.C. Don Nanjira (Kenya)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 704th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I should like to convey a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference and my own behalf, to Ambassador Munir Akram, who, as the new representative of Pakistan, is with us for the first time today. Ambassador Akram is no stranger to arms control and disarmament. Throughout his diplomatic career, he has been involved in the multilateral disarmament issues on our agenda and was an active participant in the work of this Conference at its inception. I wish to assure him of our full cooperation.

With your indulgence, I should also like to make some opening remarks as I begin my term as President of the Conference.

I have the honour and duty to convey to you the warmest greetings and best wishes of the Government and people of Kenya. His Excellency President Daniel T. Arap Moi and his Government attach great importance to the work of this Conference and take very seriously the CD's presidency which Kenya occupies from today and will hold in the coming months, including in particular during the period of the NPT review and extension Conference planned in New York for 17 April through 12 May 1995. My Government very much hopes that our efforts will be fruitful and meritorious, and that we shall make valuable contributions to the success of the NPT Conference.

My predecessor, Her Excellency Madam Kurokochi, has done a superb job. The competent manner with which she has directed the work of the Conference has been amazing. She arrived in Geneva probably on a weekend, and the following week, she assumed the presidency of CD. I can only admire such expertise so reminiscent of the alacrity of Japanese culture, and thank Ambassador Kurokochi for what she has done. If Caesar were among us today, he would, with admiration, have proclaimed "venit, vidit et sumpsit" - she came, she saw and she took charge.

Let me also thank His Excellency Ambassador Vattani of Italy for having started the work of the CD so well during this year and for the leadership that he provided us, especially during the difficult consultations which he conducted at the beginning of this session of the Conference.

(continued in Italian)

I know your country well, having been Ambassador to Italy for five years. The country gave birth to Cicerone, Marcus Aurelius and Caesar. I could not have more wonderful memories of any other country in the world.

(continued in English)

Yes, Ambassador, I have wonderful memories of Italy.

Obviously, the distinguished Ambassadors of Brazil, China, Morocco and Myanmar have also been with us for a relatively short period of time and I look forward to working closely with them and with all of you, Excellencies

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and distinguished delegates. For, though I may be the captain of the ship, all of us have our respective roles to play; all of us are on the same stage, with our respective entrances and exits. I am particularly thankful to the interpreters who facilitate our understanding of each other, and of one another. I recognize the presence of the observers and thank them for being here to participate in the great undertaking we are engaged in, for the cause of humanity. I wish to pay a special tribute to Reverend Father Peter Henry, the distinguished observer for the Holy See, who never misses to attend the plenary meetings of the Conference. Father Henry knows my country very well and has made valuable contributions to it through missionary work. Thanks also to Mr. V. Petrovsky, the Secretary-General of the Conference and special representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and to Mr. A. Bensmail and their secretariat, for the invaluable services they render to this Conference.

1995 is indeed a memorable year, for a variety of events, some fruitful and others destructive, have been shaping the year since 1 January, and it is evident that many other nasty and pleasant events will continue to shape our planet throughout 1995. This year marks the golden jubilee of the founding of the United Nations, and important activities have been planned to celebrate the occasion. Some of the international conferences and meetings held so far, or planned for later in the year, are quite historic in nature and substance, and they include the NPT review and extension Conference which is to be held on the threshold of the twenty-first century, and will go down in the history of the CD as having been one of the most important disarmament conferences of this decade, also partly because it will be the first major world disarmament conference to be held in the post-cold-war era of the new world order, expected to be safer and freer of nuclear arsenals than the cold war period had been.

This new era, however, though devoid of East-West confrontation, is nonetheless, and paradoxically, fraught with local wars, clashes and all kinds of other conflicts in some of the world's hot spots. These territorial conflicts and clashes have adverse effects beyond their borders, and sooner or later result in destabilizing and negative consequences on international peace, stability and security. As one of the beloved Presidents of the United States may be paraphrased, perpetual fear of all these occurrences may turn out to be our gravest tormentor. For, judging from the prevailing problems and conflicts, the local confrontations and wars that are so common in the world's trouble spots seem to open up more avenues for easier access to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction than they did in the cold war period.

The greatest danger, then, that we face today is that easy access to and lucrative trade in nuclear weapons, fissile materials and other weapons of mass destruction could, if allowed to prosper, lead to a more rapid spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear terrorism after the disappearance of the West-East confrontation. Such a trend could, if left unchecked, in turn lead to explosive global consequences, and gravely menace world peace and security.

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This paradoxical situation of the post-cold-war era could also result in graver local, regional and even global destabilization in the infant new world order.

It is essential, therefore, that we bear these ironies in mind as we prepare for the NPT review Conference. We, the individual representatives of the 37 Governments and States members of the CD, bear the primary responsibility of determining the future cause of general and complete disarmament. This Conference is charged with the high responsibility of negotiating and attaining nuclear and other forms of disarmament. We thus cannot afford to fail in this crucial undertaking, especially now that we have started on a countdown on the twenty-first century, and the NPT review and extension Conference is to occur in exactly three weeks' time. One hopes that we can prepare the world community to enter the next century free of nuclear proliferation. As interested partners mandated to negotiate nuclear disarmament for the survival of humankind and prevention of annihilation of the human race from the face of the Earth, we all recognize the value of the NPT as the global cornerstone for nuclear non-proliferation, and the main international instrument for controlling the spread of nuclear weapons.

The challenges facing the international community in the field of nuclear disarmament are thus many and varied, and known to all of us. Nevertheless and based on the foregoing remarks, I would regard the following observations and conclusions as being logical and pertinent at this point in time of my statement.

First, any possession of nuclear weapons nowadays is prompted by a far broader scope of reasons than mere military, security, political or even strategic reasons. Aspects of morality, law, prestige and economics have assumed greater significance than in the past. And what would be better, in this connection, and in the post-cold-war era, than creating, for example, a clear and lasting interconnection between disarmament and development?

Second, for the non-proliferation regime to be lasting and comprehensive on a global scale, it must be effected by measures calling for the enactment of non-proliferation laws, agreements and policies at the national, international, bilateral and multilateral levels.

Third, in the post-cold-war world, nuclear-weapon States perhaps bear much heavier responsibility than ever before for the attainment of global security. A re-examination of their commitment under the NPT, especially under its article VI, might hence be most worthwhile in order to look into the most effective and globally acceptable ways and means of assuring total nuclear disarmament. In like manner, the security needs of the non-nuclear States are much greater today than those of the nuclear Powers. Therefore, the best way to prevent further acquisition, or temptations to acquire nuclear weapons, is to abolish the existing ones. As we all know, however, the declared nuclear-weapon States have made commendable declarations of security assurances. But the non-nuclear-weapon States very much desire that these declarations be transformed into a legally binding instrument. Such action would definitely reaffirm the responsibility of the nuclear Powers toward

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achieving nuclear disarmament and recommit these States to attain that goal. A legally binding document would be helpful, as it would remove all the fears that declarations are not binding. The latest offer by the nuclear Powers of negative security assurances to the Security Council is particularly noteworthy, and raises an enormous appetite for a big surprise at the NPT Conference. One hopes that this appetite can be satisfied.

Fourth, and as for the non-nuclear-weapon States of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, many of them have indeed signed the NPT. They thus firmly argue that they deserve to receive security assurances for protection against the use, attack, or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the NPT want, it is clear, to have access to the transfer of science and technology for peaceful purposes, under the IAEA safeguards. Those States of the non-nuclear-weapons category which have not yet ratified the NPT obviously have concerns which are well known to this Conference, and have been taken note of. These States should nonetheless be encouraged to re-examine the value of the NPT as a most crucial and obvious contributor to global security.

Fifth, and in order to facilitate the negotiating process within CD, it would be best, I think, to exercise our political will to agree on a package of issues and measures to be taken within the CD's mandate.

If I may now speak on my own behalf, and as an interested participant in the work of this Conference and in a successful outcome of the NPT review Conference, I would expect that Conference to achieve at least the following. Firstly, extend the NPT, which is an invaluable instrument for global security. Secondly, encourage the nuclear Powers to continue their efforts toward achieving nuclear disarmament. Thirdly, encourage the CD, if the CTBT is not, as it appears, ready before the NPT Conference, to continue its efforts toward the conclusion of a universal, non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable CTBT. Such a treaty would augur very well for the nuclear disarmament process permanently and comprehensively banning all nuclear tests everywhere. Real hard work is under way, and one hopes that agreement can be reached as soon as practicable. In this connection I wish to recognize the valuable contributions made by Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico, and his successor, Ambassador Dembinski of Poland, to the test ban process. What a pity Ambassador Marín Bosch will be leaving us so soon. He reminds me of the late legend García Robles, and when I think of Ambassador García Robles, I am reminded of my maiden speech in the then Committee on Disarmament in the spring session of 1982.

Fourthly, the review Conference should encourage the revitalization, or creation as appropriate, of the necessary institutional mechanisms for the negotiation of the issues before the CD, which mechanisms would assist, facilitate and advance the negotiating process. The questions of CD expansion, improved and effective functioning, fissile material cut-off, agenda and status of negotiations within the CD, and the appointment or reappointment of special coordinators, coordinators or Friends of the Chair and the like, should be looked into very seriously. Those mechanisms which

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have been revitalized and are working have my fullest support and encouragement; and now that the Conference has agreed, on 23 March 1995, to create a new ad hoc committee on "cut-off" with a mandate as read out by Ambassador Shannon of Canada, I urge the CD to accelerate the consultative process so that the Chairman of the Committee can be appointed and start tackling, among others, and I underline among others, the problems of stocks and use of fissile materials, both of which are critical aspects of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. I congratulate Ambassador Shannon on his tireless efforts that have resulted in the consensus and thank him and the entire membership of the Conference for this welcome achievement.

Fifthly, the NPT review Conference should aim at achieving nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and elsewhere in the world.

As regards expansion in the CD's membership, Ambassador O'Sullivan's list of 23 new member States offers a good basis for a consensus which, I hope, will be achieved soon.

Before I conclude my statement, I should like to say something about the place and role of the mighty continent of Africa in the field of nuclear disarmament. Africa's contribution to the NPT Conference should not be underestimated. The contribution toward the non-proliferation regime is being made regionally through the African nuclear-weapon-free zone. It is noteworthy that out of the 54 African countries, 50 have already ratified the NPT. They include of course my own country, Kenya, which ratified the Treaty on Thursday, 11 June 1970. Furthermore, a large number of African States have concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA, as required under the NPT. Thus, Africa will be a crucial factor in the decision-making process during the NPT Conference in New York, given the large number of 50 States which have ratified the Treaty including all the African member States of this very Conference.

On the African front also, progress is being made at two levels: a text on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone has been drafted and the text will be considered and finalized at the next meeting of the Group of Experts set up jointly by OAU and the United Nations. The meeting will be held in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 29 May to 2 June 1995. And the expert Group will arrange for the treaty to be submitted to the OAU summit to be held in Adis Ababa in June of this year.

Given the great importance Africa attaches to this treaty, I believe that it will receive very serious consideration by the African heads of State or Government. And once endorsed by OAU, the treaty could be regarded as Africa's major contribution to the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations.

Thus, Your Excellencies and distinguished delegates, we have a formidable international agenda and challenging tasks lying ahead of us, on the eve of the NPT review Conference. I very much hope that you will do me the honour of being the proud President of this august body, under whose stewardship, it will be recorded, that consensus was reached within CD, and on the crucial issues before the NPT Conference. All of us, I repeat, individually and

(The President)

collectively, and the mighty Governments that we represent, and all the other relevant entities and personalities, have a duty to make the NPT Conference a resounding success. We are condemned to succeed, I believe, and as President of this Conference, I would very much prefer that we work out an honest, fair and meaningful package consensus on the issues and activities of the CD mandate which we could brag about at the NPT Conference, and beyond.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Cuba and Brazil and the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. I now give the floor to the representative of Cuba, Ambassador Pérez Novoa.

Mr. PEREZ NOVOA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr President, distinguished colleagues, it is a pleasure for me to take the floor before this Conference at a time when it is being chaired by yourself, with whom we have maintained close and effective relations of cooperation within the United Nations. I wish you every success in your present duties. I would also like to express appreciation to your predecessors for their performance in the Chair.

Last September our delegation to this Conference announced the decision taken by the Cuban Government to sign the treaty for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Today, I have pleasure in reporting that, in pursuance of the commitment entered into by President Fidel Castro Ruz on the occasion of the first Ibero-American summit in Guadalajara, the Cuban Government signed the above-mentioned Treaty on 25 March. On that occasion the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba made the following statement:

> "The Government of the Republic of Cuba declares that the obstacles which have thereto prevented full participation by the Republic of Cuba in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean still obtain and continue to affect Cuban security seriously. The only nuclear Power in this part of the world, the United States of America, is maintaining a policy of hostility against Cuba; it is stepping up its economic, trade and financial blockade; it is reinforcing its campaign against the country and perpetuating, by force and contrary to the will of our people, the illegal occupation of part of our national territory, through which its vessels transit bearing nuclear weapons, a problem whose solution will have to be regarded in the future as a precondition for our country's continued participation in the Treaty."

Cuba has always spoken out against all weapons of mass extermination. No country or group of countries should have a monopoly of such weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, which in our world bring about a privileged status which is in flagrant breach of the principle of the sovereign equality of States. We advocate the total disappearance of nuclear weapons as the sole means of embarking irrevocably on a path leading to lasting peace and security for all on an equal footing. Cuba, which has neither the resources, the technology nor the wish to develop such weapons, did not sign the Treaty of

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Tlatelolco earlier for strictly moral reasons and because for many years it found itself in a regional context from which, with the honourable exception of Mexico, attempts were made to isolate it.

Today the situation is different. Major changes have come about on the continent. At present, not only do we have excellent relations with practically all the countries that belong to it, but these relations are becoming closer and more diversified and form an important part of the pattern of changes under way within our country. The remaining Latin American countries, which had not signed the Treaty until recently, have now done so, and as we stated, this fact was a further significant element in the adoption of our decision. It was these considerations which brought about and explain our decision to sign the Treaty of Tlatelolco. What was an act of unilateral renunciation in another age, in exchange for which we encountered only incomprehension, hostility and threats, now forms part of a qualitatively different regional context.

This gesture by Cuba should therefore be construed as a further expression of my country's determination to become fully integrated in the Latin American and Caribbean community, and confirmation of our confidence in the future of a united Latin America. It is also the reaffirmation by the Government of the Republic of Cuba of the genuinely peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. We also consider that the verification of the obligations assumed by the nuclear Powers under Protocols I and II to this instrument would strengthen confidence that the region is indeed free from nuclear weapons, because renunciation of the nuclear option is not only an obligation on those countries which do not belong to the Security Council.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Cuba for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil, Ambassador Saboia.

Mr. SABOIA (Brazil): Mr. President, allow me at the outset to express my delegation's warm congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. It is a great pleasure to see in such high office an illustrious representative of Kenya, a country with which Brazil enjoys a long tradition of friendly relations. We have only to benefit from your well-known diplomatic dexterity and commitment to the lofty goals of this Conference in the discharge of your duties. Be assured of the Brazilian delegation's full support in these endeavours. Let me also pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Hisami Kurokochi, whose deft handling of the complex issues before this body was further highlighted by the fact that she took up the presidential incumbency only days after assuming her new responsibilities in Geneva as the representative of Japan to the Conference. Ambassador Vattani of Italy also deserves our gratitude and appreciation for his effective leadership in conducting the initial phase of this session. Allow me also to extend a warm welcome to Ambassador Munir Akram of Pakistan as he takes part for the first time at the current session of the CD.

As we near the conclusion of the first part of the 1995 CD session, the Brazilian delegation feels it appropriate to share with members of and

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participants in the CD our opinion and reflections on certain points and issues which have occupied us for the greater part of the past two months. Before doing so, I wish to take this opportunity to highlight a recent event that my Government finds of particular significance. I refer to the adherence by Cuba to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean - the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Together with the recent decisions on the part of Saint Lucia and Saint Kitts and Nevis to join Tlatelolco, the Cuban adherence means the Treaty and its protocols now apply to the whole Latin American and Caribbean region, rendering it in effect a nuclear-weapon-free zone subject to legally binding negative security assurances on the part of the five nuclear-weapon States. Since Brazil was the first country, back in the early 1960s, to propose to the United Nations General Assembly that our region be free of such weapons, it is for us especially gratifying to now witness the fulfilment of that ideal. We thus take great pleasure in congratulating the Cuban delegation for its Government's decision, and in welcoming that nation as a full party to the Treaty.

With regard to issues before the CD, I would first of all like to stress my delegation's satisfaction at the decision taken during our last plenary meeting whereby the Conference established an ad hoc committee to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices - the "cut-off" treaty. We owe this historic decision to Ambassador Gerald Shannon's untiring efforts as Special Coordinator for this issue, and no less to his skill, experience and boldness. The very fact that the CD is now in agreement to undertake negotiations on a cut-off treaty has by itself a deep political significance. It is heartening for the international community to know that this body is willing and able to move forward in banning the production of fissile material. However, for all our contentment with what was achieved last week, we must not lose sight of the sobering fact that the treaty's real effectiveness for international disarmament and non-proliferation will be determined by how it will deal not only with future production of fissile material, but also with the existing stockpiles of such material. It is the continued unchecked holdings of large quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium that poses the greatest horizontal and vertical proliferation risks. Moreover, how is one to effectively verify compliance with a ban on new production without adequate knowledge of the amounts already in existence? We believe these to be genuine concerns that bear directly upon the scope of the future treaty and therefore merit to be properly considered in the newly established ad hoc committee.

By the very action of establishing the Ad Hoc Committee on cut-off, this Conference has succeeded in sending a positive message with regard to tackling one fundamental issue subsumed under item 2 of its agenda. Such forthrightness, however, stands in stark contrast to what the CD has been able to achieve so far this session with regard to the establishment of other ad hoc committees or the appointment of special coordinators to deal with equally pressing issues on its agenda. We fail to understand why the decision to re-establish the ad hoc committees on prevention of a nuclear arms race in outer space and on negative security assurances, for which consensus seems secure, has so far not been brought before the Conference to take, or why

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those issues which - regrettably - may not command consensus at this stage, such as the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments or the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, have not been entrusted to special coordinators. We must also continue to strive for an urgent and appropriate solution to the problem of expansion. Those are questions and responsibilities this Conference and its presidency should not shirk from.

Amidst the frustration of watching this part of the session go by without decisions on many of these issues, we should nevertheless take heart in the prompt re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty - indeed a fitting attitude, given the high expectations held by the international community that such a long overdue treaty might finally be within grasp. These expectations were reflected in the consensus United Nations General Assembly resolution 49/70, which called upon the CD to proceed to a new phase of negotiation, and through which all CD members, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, were urged to negotiate intensively and to conclude such a treaty. We see the CTB treaty as essentially a political instrument. Commitment to its fundamental objectives and to its early conclusion, particularly on the part of the States with the capacity to test, is thus indispensable for progress to be achieved in the current negotiations. Continued leadership is instrumental in this regard. It has been encouraging to begin this year's session learning of the decisions by the United States to extend its moratorium on testing, to drop its earlier proposal of a special withdrawal provision, and to suggest inter-sessional work. We also welcome President Clinton's repeated calls for achieving a CTB treaty at the earliest possible time.

We believe useful work has overall been achieved this session up to now on the draft CTBT. The coming publication of a revised rolling text should help us gauge progress in terms of brackets removed and of newly drafted or revised text. We owe much of what was achieved to Ambassadors Ludwik Dembinski, Lars Norberg and Jaap Ramaker for the professional and efficient manner in which they have been fulfilling their duties as chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committee and of the two working groups. We are also indebted to the numerous colleagues who have assisted them as Friends of the Chair or convenors for specific topics. Notwithstanding all these efforts, however, certain positions with regard to key articles being negotiated continue to give rise to concern. On the question of the scope of the treaty, for instance, it seems clear that proposals either to excessively broaden the extent of the ban or to introduce exceptions and limitations to it simply will not command general support, not to speak of the disquieting fact that some of them run counter to the very mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee. Insistence on such proposals is indeed a worrisome development at this stage. Its only practical effect is that of stalling the whole negotiation, given the fundamental nature of the scope provisions. We believe the way forward on scope is best reflected in document CD/NTB/WP.222, circulated by the Australian delegation, whom we commend for this useful and timely initiative.

Another key element of the treaty is its article on entry into force. It is clear that the credibility and effectiveness of the treaty is contingent

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upon its universality, or at least upon its acceptance among testing-capable States. The question here is to reconcile this reality with our equally imperative needs to keep the treaty non-discriminatory. We shall be examining carefully all proposals recently put forward which attend to these considerations.

As regards verification, we would first of all like to thank the experts led by Dr. Peter Marshall for all their efforts and for the reports they have recently issued on the results of their work. Even though it was not possible for the expert Group to achieve consensus on a single international monitoring system design as required under the mandate, we nevertheless believe their technical input to be useful for progress in the rolling text. Their reports no doubt provide a solid technical repository which can be drawn upon for the political decisions that are now needed for further drafting progress in the verification provisions of the rolling text. Until such decisions are made we see no reason for further technical discussions on the envisaged verification technologies. With regard to the characteristics of the IMS, we stand by our position that a sophisticated mechanism based on the four technologies such as the one contemplated must provide a solid basis for subsequent technical assessment of the nature of the events it detects, and that the organization must have access to all the required expertise and analytical capability at hand to carry out such an assessment.

It is clear that to make significant strides on issues such as the future CTBT organization, we will need to have a more precise idea on the treaty's verification regime, as well as on the basic undertakings States will be willing to make in articles such as scope and entry into force. For our part, Brazil favours a small, treaty-specific organization which would make full use of existing national or international technical capabilities and would work in close association with other international organizations or agencies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, by means of specific contracts or agreements. We believe this to be the most advantageous, efficient and cost-effective framework for the future organization.

Our overall assessment of the current first part of this year's session is that it has been encouraging in some respects but deeply disturbing in others. It is our conviction, though, that the negotiating opportunities are there to take. It would be unwise for us to let them pass by. The international community expects no less of us.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Brazil for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, Dr. Ola Dahlman, who will introduce the Group's progress report on its fortieth session. This report is contained in document CD/1296.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): I appreciate this opportunity to report to you on the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group held from 20 February to 3 March 1995, with the participation of experts and representatives from 32 countries. The progress report of the meeting is contained in document CD/1296, which has

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been distributed. I would from the outset like to acknowledge the eminent services by the secretariat that the Group has enjoyed throughout its session. We are truly satisfied at the way it handles our most technical material. The Ad Hoc Group's secretary, Ms. Mackby, has also been instrumental in facilitating increased participation in the Group's experiment through contacts with CD delegations.

The Ad Hoc Group meeting was devoted to reviewing the initial results of the large-scale technical test, usually referred to as GSETT-3, which started its full-scale phase on 1 January 1995. This test is an unprecedented effort to develop, test and evaluate new concepts for an experimental international seismic monitoring system.

I am pleased to report to you that the initial phase of this full-scale operation has started successfully. A fairly large system, containing globally distributed seismological stations, national data centres and an International Data Centre in Arlington, Virginia, United States of America, is up and running. The system is achieving its basic objectives of acquiring, storing, analysing and disseminating data. Bulletins containing the results of the analysis have also been regularly distributed from the International Data Centre to participating national data centres.

The successful start of the experiment is due to the dedicated efforts of hundreds of scientists and technicians at stations and national data centres around the world who have worked very hard to establish and to put their facilities into operation in a coordinated way. Particularly noteworthy is the successful effort to get the International Data Centre into a smooth on-line operation on time.

It is still too early to draw any definite conclusions on the results of GSETT-3 as it has just started. The GSE has established, as you may recall, a working group to continuously evaluate the test as it progresses and the results it produces. The elaborations during the Ad Hoc Group's meeting were based on a preliminary report from this working group and on similar reports from the working groups on planning and operations. A summary of these reports is annexed to the progress report.

The Group of Scientific Experts envisages a network of 60 primary or alpha stations for GSETT-3. The alpha stations comprise the basic network that detects the events. Today we have 49 out of these 60 stations committed, meaning that the countries have made a formal commitment to submit data from those stations. I do hope that the Group, with your cooperation, will be able to obtain participation of the remaining 11 stations as well. Not all of the committed stations are, however, today in operation or connected on-line to the International Data Centre, and in some cases substantial technical work remains. The other network is the supplemental network, which we call the beta network. Here the Group of Scientific Experts has not designed any particular station configuration but we anticipate a well-distributed network of some 150 stations. Today we have 95 such stations committed. Most of these stations are, however, located in Europe and North America, which means that a fair amount of additional beta stations are still needed to

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obtain adequate geographical coverage. Efforts are still under way to obtain commitments for more such stations, primarily in the southern hemisphere.

When it comes to actual operation, GSETT-3 had by 1 March 76 stations which were actually reporting data on line. An annex to the progress report contains a map showing the locations of the stations. Thirty-two of these stations are alpha stations and 44 are beta stations. The alpha stations are reporting continuously to the International Data Centre, whereas data from the beta stations are automatically requested by the International Data Centres when needed. Quite a substantial amount of information goes into the International Data Centre; it corresponds to about 1 million pages of information every day. The system detects on an average some 60 seismic events every day. Nature has, however, already tested the system by providing more than 200 earthquakes in one single day following a large quake off the coast of New Zealand.

The basic idea with this system and in particular with the International Data Centre is to draw information important for CTBT verification out of this huge amount of reported original data and to condense this information down to something that is manageable - a couple of pages per day. The International Data Centre has been doing an excellent job in actually achieving that. It has managed to cope with this large data flow and to produce bulletins as scheduled. An automatic report is going out within one hour after the occurrence of an event and a more comprehensive bulletin, which is based on analysis by experts, goes out after two days. This information is distributed to the national data centres for their evaluation and assessment.

The International Data Centre is also offering custom-made bulletins that contain just the information that is of interest to a particular participant. The GSETT-3 International Data Centre is not providing identification of detected seismic events, but will soon calculate and compile agreed parameters, which characterize the observed signals and which may assist participating countries in identifying the source of the event.

The International Data Centre, which is a key facility for GSETT-3, has presently a staff of 47 people; 10 of these are internationally recruited for limited time. The Group is most satisfied to have this international staffing of the Centre, which contributes to the spreading of knowledge about International Data Centre operations to many countries. The operation at the International Data Centre is continuously expanding and improving as more and more stations are coming on line. I am also pleased to report that the communication system that used to be a bottleneck is now functioning very well and we now have on-line computer-to-computer connections between essentially all the participants in the experiment.

In setting up such a large experiment as GSETT-3 you need extensive documentation to advise the various operators in the system at the stations, the International Data Centre and the national data centres on what they should do. The Group has developed extended documentation that could also be a good basis for establishing the operational manuals to guide the practical operation of the IMS system that you finally decide to establish.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

The system being tested during GSETT-3 is evolutionary in nature. Additional stations, improved instrumentation and new processing methods are expected to be incorporated as the test progresses. The GSE is conducting ongoing assessment of various system components during GSETT-3. Results will be continually incorporated into the system to improve its performance so that the system will be capable of providing the Conference on Disarmament with information and experience relevant to the establishment and operation of a future system for monitoring a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The Group of Scientific Experts considers that the GSETT-3 system is already providing an infrastructure in the form of technical facilities, including education and training of personnel, which would facilitate the implementation of a monitoring system. GSETT-3 is also providing experience with data services that will be needed by the national verification programmes of the participating States.

GSETT-3 has proven to be useful for the work conducted by the International Monitoring System Expert Group in evaluating options for a future seismic monitoring system. While the scope of GSETT-3 is limited to seismic monitoring, the GSETT-3 system design is flexible enough to incorporate the collection, archiving and distribution of data also from non-seismic techniques such as radioactivity, hydroacoustics and infrasound.

The Group also discussed its future plans for GSETT-3. The Group agreed that continuation of GSETT-3 for an extended period of time along the operational plans outlined in CD/1254 would be important to progressively modify the system to meet the international monitoring system (IMS) design, as decisions are made by the CD on the seismic component of a future IMS. This would also ensure continued training of an international staff and continued provision of practical advice to the CD. In addition, the GSE could cooperate in experiments to demonstrate the synergy between the seismic IMS and other non-seismic IMS components, if requested by the nuclear test ban Ad Hoc Committee. For financial planning purposes, countries participating in GSETT-3 should be prepared to support their national facilities and communications links at least through 1996.

It was noted that a technical upgrade is needed for some of the stations envisioned as part of the GSETT-3 monitoring network (CD/1254). It is also of great importance to ensure financial resources for continuous data transmission from existing stations and for the establishment and operation of new stations in areas where the GSETT-3 coverage today is inadequate. Countries are encouraged to support by providing technical and financial assistance in these areas to other countries whose participation is essential.

As to the interaction with the nuclear test ban Committee, the Ad Hoc Group received and appreciated a briefing from the Chairman of its Working Group on Verification. Upon invitation by the Chairman, I gave a presentation to the Working Group on the GSETT-3 experiment.

The Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 7 to 18 August 1995. The main task during the next session will be to review and evaluate results

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

from the full-scale phase of GSETT-3. The Group is prepared to meet during the second part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament if so requested by the CD in view of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Dr. Dahlman for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. With regard to the recommendation contained in paragraph 11 of document CD/1296 to the effect that the next session of the Ad Hoc Group will be held from 7 to 18 August 1995, these dates will have to be agreed to by the Conference and it is my intention to ask for such a decision to be taken at the plenary next Thursday, 6 April.

I do not have any more speakers on my list. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marín Bosch.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I have asked for the floor in my capacity as representative of the depositary Government for the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Treaty of Tlatelolco). But before doing so allow me to congratulate you on taking up the post of President of the Conference and to extend to you the wholehearted cooperation of the Mexican delegation. We wish to place on record our appreciation for the way in which the distinguished representative of Japan presided over our work in the past four weeks. We welcome the colleagues who have recently arrived, including of course Ambassador Munir Akram of Pakistan, who took his place in this room this morning.

We listened with particular satisfaction this morning to the statement by the distinguished representative of Cuba, our friend Ambassador José Pérez Novoa. We welcome the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco by Cuba on 25 March, on the very eve of the fourteenth session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), which is taking place this week in Viña del Mar in Chile. This completes the cycle which began in 1967 with the opening for signature of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated region. As the Treaty now comes into full effect for Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and with the accession last week by Saint Kitts and Nevis and Saint Lucia, the zone of application of the Treaty covers 25 million square kilometres inhabited by more than 450 million human beings. Mexico welcomed this event of particular significance for our entire region in the person of my country's Minister for Foreign Affairs, José Angel Gurría, at the signing ceremony in Havana. In the words of the Foreign Minister, "Mexico values Cuba's accession to the Treaty of Tlatelolco as a renewed demonstration of Cuba's willingness to subscribe to the consensus positions reached by Latin America and the Caribbean", and he added that this was "clear proof of Cuba's resolve to stress dialogue and negotiation as essential elements of international coexistence".

For more than 30 years the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have been convinced that military denuclearization is the right path for achieving a truly secure world. The consolidation of a nuclear-weapon-free

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zone in our region is the clearest evidence of our rejection of a concept of peace which is based on an alleged nuclear balance or a threat of mutual annihilation. We congratulate the Cuban Government on its decision to join an authentic and non-discriminatory non-proliferation regime for nuclear weapons. Our region has practised what it preaches. Alfonso García Robles would be very pleased.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada.

Mr. BISHOP (Canada): Mr. President, my delegation would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the CD presidency at this important period and to assure you of my delegation's full support throughout your presidency. I would also like to pay tribute to the effective and productive way in which your predecessor, Ambassador Kurokochi of Japan, undertook her duties over the last month, especially as a newcomer here. My delegation would also like to thank both you and Ambassador Saboia for the kind remarks directed towards Ambassador Shannon and assure you both that they will, of course, be conveyed to him.

The purpose of my asking for the floor today is simply to take the opportunity to announce that my delegation is in the process of having distributed the papers from the Toronto Cut-off Workshop which took place from 16 to 19 January 1995. They are presented with the particular attention of allowing those who could not be present to benefit from the results of the Workshop. The Canadian Government would like to express special thanks to those here who presented papers at the Workshop and otherwise contributed to the success there.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. This completes the list of speakers for today.

As delegations are aware, despite the measure of progress already achieved in the Conference so far, there remain a number of pending issues relating to the Presidential statement covering the agenda and organization of the 1995 session. These pending issues continue to be the subject of intensive consultations and I am sure that with further effort and good will the Conference will succeed in resolving them.

The secretariat has, at my request, circulated a timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference during next week, which will also be the last week of the first part of its 1995 session. This was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, is tentative and subject to change, if necessary. On this basis, may I consider that the timetable is acceptable to the Conference? This seems to be the case.

The next meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 6 April 1995 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.